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PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN SCOTLAND 
 
Tom Mullen* 
University of Glasgow 
 
 
Introduction: what is public interest litigation? 
 
The 30th anniversary of the judicial review procedure seems an appropriate time to examine 
the current state and future prospects of public interest litigation in Scotland. Public interest 
litigation may be defined as any litigation in which the person raising the action or 
intervening in the action seeks to advance a widely shared interest rather than an interest 
which is specific to him/her, and includes both cases which seek to advance only interests 
which are widely shared and cases in which a litigant who does have a personal stake in the 
outcome also presents public interest arguments. Public interest litigation has become 
increasingly common in recent decades and has affected a variety of policy areas including 
environmental protection, land use planning, energy generation and distribution, social 
security and human rights protection. 
 
Public interest litigation may be pursued using various causes of action in various fora and 
through various procedures, but the most likely forum for public interest litigation in Scotland 
is the Court of Session and the procedure most likely to be used is that of judicial review. The 
introduction of the specialised procedure for judicial review in 1985 did not change the 
prospects of litigation being brought in the public interest. In fact, calls to amend the law of 
standing – which might have facilitated public interest litigation - were rejected on the basis 
that it was not competent to change the substantive law by Act of Sederunt, the vehicle 
chosen for introducing the new procedure.1 It is only in the last decade, and particularly since 
the decision of the Supreme Court in AXA General Insurance v Lord Advocate2 that 
significant change has occurred in this area,  
 
Historically, judicial review litigation in the United Kingdom’s three jurisdictions followed a 
private law model under which it was assumed that the only appropriate litigants were those 
pursuing their own interests. The most obvious manifestation of this was the law of standing 
to seek judicial review which in practice excluded actions brought to advance the public 
interest where those raising the action did not have a greater interest in the outcome of the 
litigation than that of the public generally, or of a large section of it. In recent years, this has 
been replaced by a model of standing which recognises the value of public interest litigation, 
although this has occurred only within the last four years in Scotland. The expansion of 
standing has been accompanied by developments in the law on public interest intervention 
and protective expenses orders. This article reviews developments in these three areas and 
considers the future prospects for public interest litigation in Scotland.  
 
But, before reviewing the recent case law and legislation on standing and on other relevant 
matters such as expenses, it is necessary to consider the rationale for public interest litigation. 
 
 
                                                          
* Professor of Law, University of Glasgow. 
1 Lord Dunpark, Report to the Rt Hon Lord Emslie, Lord President of the Court of Session by the Working Party 
on Procedure for Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1984), para. 9. 
2 [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] SC (UKSC) 122. 
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The rationale for public interest litigation 
 
The purposes of judicial review 
 
In a recent article, I discussed the rationale for public interest litigation at some length and so 
will provide only a brief summary here.3 The argument begins with establishing the 
purpose(s) of judicial review. The traditional answer was that it was to keep public bodies 
within the limits of their powers, and it was achieved by having the ultra vires principle as the 
core of judicial review.4 In recent decades, other candidates have emerged for recognition as 
purposes of judicial review each of which has slightly different implications for public 
interest judicial review. There is, however, a consensus that keeping public bodies within the 
limits of their powers is at least one of the purposes of judicial review. This rationale for 
judicial review can be seen as an expression of the constitutional principle of the rule of law. 
There are many interpretations of the concept of the rule of law but the most widely accepted 
view is that it means, at the very least,5 that government must be able to show legal authority 
for its actions. For many, this is not a sufficient account of the rule of law, but few would 
deny that this is an essential part of it.6 
 
The notion that the purpose of judicial review is to ensure that public bodies stay within the 
limits of their powers, resting as it does on the constitutional principle of the rule of law, is 
capable of providing a consensus rationale for public interest litigation. Other more expansive 
views of the purposes of judicial review also provide arguments for permitting or 
encouraging public interest litigation, but, as they are more contentious, they are less likely to 
provide a widely accepted basis for it, and it is the rule of law rationale which the UK courts 
have in fact adopted as the basis for accepting public interest litigation. This article will, 
therefore, proceed on the basis that the rule of law rationale provides an appropriate 
theoretical basis for determining the minimum extent to which the legal system should permit 
or encourage public interest litigation, whilst accepting that other rationales might suggest a 
wider scope for it. 
 
Until the 1970s, it seemed to be assumed that the private law model of litigation was 
adequate to ensure both observance of the particular laws governing executive action and, 
more generally, respect for the rule of law by executive government. In fact, it was not 
because, if standing is only granted to those with a particular interest, there is a real risk that 
unlawful decisions and acts of government will not be challenged, either because no-one is 
entitled to sue (no person having a greater interest than any other) or because those who do 
have the necessary standing choose not to sue (there being several reasons why persons who 
have legal rights may not wish to enforce them).  Ensuring that government does comply with 
the law, therefore, requires that it be possible for persons who do not have a personal stake in 
the outcome to litigate in the public interest. 
 
The need for public interest litigation has arguably increased as a result of the major 
constitutional reforms of the last forty or so years: membership of the EU, devolution and the 
                                                          
3 See T. Mullen, “Protective expenses orders and public interest litigation” 19 Edinburgh Law Review 36 (2015). 
4 See, e.g. Moss’ Empires Ltd v Assessor for Glasgow 1917 SC (HL) 1, Lord Shaw of Dunfermline, at p. 11. 
5 See, e.g. K. D. Ewing & A. Bradley, Constitutional and Administrative Law (15th edn) (London: Pearson 
Longman, 2011) ch, 6. 
6 There is a large literature. See, e.g. J. Raz, “The Rule of Law and its Virtue” (1977) 93 LQR 195 and P. Craig, 
“Formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law: an analytical framework” [1997] Public Law 467. 
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Human Rights Act 1998. These have constitutionalised the government of the UK to a 
considerable degree, creating legal constraints on government action (particularly as to the 
permissible content of legislation) where before there were only political constraints. Whilst, 
some are opposed to, or sceptical about some of these developments,7 there is no doubt that 
they have expanded the role of the courts; both the substantive grounds of judicial review and 
its intensity have increased. Whilst to some extent we can rely on individuals who are directly 
affected by specific decisions, to challenge governmental illegality, we cannot do so entirely. 
The constitutionalisation of the legal order has, therefore, increased the need for public 
interest litigation. Perhaps, most significantly, these constitutional changes have increased the 
possibilities for challenging legislative as opposed to executive decisions. This in turn means 
that the range of public interest considerations that may be relevant to a court’s decision on 
legality has been broadened compared to challenges based on the traditional grounds of 
review. This in turn creates a need for a wider range of persons to be able to participate in 
litigation to ensure that the full range of public interest considerations is brought to bear. 
 
 
Arguments against public interest litigation 
 
A number of arguments have been made - mainly in the context of standing - against 
permitting public interest litigation, but these are now largely discredited as convincing 
reasons for restricting access to the courts.8 Thus, for example, fears of the courts being 
overwhelmed by a flood of cases are exaggerated. The English experience suggests that the 
expansion of public interest litigation has not added dramatically to the judicial review case-
load; in fact, the enormous growth in the volume of judicial reviews is mainly attributable to 
immigration cases in which the applicant undoubtedly has a personal stake in the outcome.9 
There is no reason to suppose that public interest litigants are more likely to mount ill-
founded cases than those with a personal stake in litigation. In any event, the new 
requirement to seek permission for judicial review imposed by s. 27B of the Court of Session 
Act 198810 should, if it works as intended, weed out ill-founded cases at an early stage thus 
limiting any possible waste of court time. The concern over politicisation can be met 
provided the courts ensure that they only adjudicate justiciable questions, and it is not likely 
that they will change their approach to deciding what is or is not justiciable merely because 
they hear more cases brought by public interest litigants.  Similarly, we can reasonably expect 
courts to continue to reject cases asking abstract or hypothetical questions as being unsuitable 
for adjudication, as they have done in the past. 
 
Even if permitting public interest litigation did have adverse effects of the type listed above, 
that would not be a conclusive argument against it. The essential point is that public interest 
litigation is necessary in order to guarantee respect for the rule of law by executive 
government. Relying solely on persons who litigate to advance their own interests will not 
achieve that aim. It would have to be shown that the potential disadvantages of permitting 
public interest litigation listed above outweighed the gains achieved in terms of better 
                                                          
7 See, e.g., J. A. G. Griffith, “The Political Constitution” (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 1, T. Campbell, K. D. 
Ewing, and A. Tomkins (eds), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
8 For a more detailed discussion of the arguments, see P. Craig, Administrative Law (7th edn) (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2012), ch 25; T. Mullen, “Standing to Seek Judicial Review” in A. McHarg & T. Mullen (eds), Public 
Law in Scotland (Edinburgh: Avizandum, 2006). 
9 See, e.g. Ministry of Justice, Civil Justice Statistics Quarterly, England and Wales and Appellate Court 
Statistics 2014 (June 2015). 
10 Inserted by s. 89 of the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 with effect from 22 September 2015. 
4 
 
securing the rule of law. I will, therefore, proceed on the assumption that there is a strong 
case for permitting and facilitating public interest litigation for the purpose of ensuring 
respect for the rule of law and will now consider to what extent Scots law does actually 
permit and facilitate it. 
 
 
Standing 
 
Until recently, the approach to standing to sue in Scots law discouraged public interest 
litigation. As noted above, standing was based on a private rights model under which a 
person had to show that s/he had both title and interest to sue or defend an action.11 In 
practice, the Court of Session would recognise standing only where a litigant was asserting 
his/her legal rights and where the outcome would materially affect the interests of one of the 
parties to the case. When applied to administrative law, this private rights model of judicial 
review, made extremely difficult to for those who did not have a personal stake in the 
outcome to seek judicial review in the public interest.12 The negative effects on public 
interest litigation can be illustrated by two modern cases: Scottish Old People’s Welfare 
Council, Petitioners13 and Rape Crisis Centre v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department14 In the former case, a charity claiming to represent the interests of old people 
challenged guidance on entitlement to cold weather heating payments issued by the Chief 
Adjudication Officer on the basis that it included errors of law and was ultra vires. The 
petition was refused as although Lord Clyde considered that they had title to sue, they did not 
have an interest to sue. In the latter case, an organisation campaigning against sexual violence 
sought to challenge the Home Secretary’s decision to allow former World Heavyweight 
Champion, Mike Tyson, leave to enter the UK for a boxing match despite his having a 
conviction for rape; something which would normally have precluded granting of leave. 
Again the petition was refused, Lord Clarke considering that that they had interest to sue, but 
not title. 
 
The position was in marked contrast to that in English law. There, too, a restrictive approach 
based on the private rights model had been taken, but in a series of cases from the early 
1980s, beginning with Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-
Employed and Small Businesses Ltd,15  the English courts abandoned the restrictive approach 
to standing, interpreting the statutory test of “sufficient interest”16 broadly in order to allow 
persons and groups to represent the public interest. The Scottish courts, however, maintained 
the restrictive approach long after it was abandoned in England. 
 
                                                          
11 The key cases included D & J Nicol v Dundee Harbour Trustees 1915 SC (HL) 7 and Swanson v Manson 
1907 SC 426. 
12 For a detailed account, see T. Mullen, “Standing to Seek Judicial Review”, above. 
13 1987 SLT 179. 
14 2002 SLT 389. 
15 15 [1982] AC 617. See also, e.g. R v Felixstowe Justices, ex parte Leigh [1987] QB 582, R v Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Rees-Mogg [1994] QB 552, R v Inspectorate of Pollution, ex 
parte Greenpeace (No2) [1994] 4 All ER 329 and R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, ex parte World Development Movement Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 611. For analysis, see P. Craig, 
Administrative Law, 25-011 to 25-23. 
16 Senior Courts Act 1981, s. 31. 
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That restrictive approach was subject to academic criticism17 and the Scottish Civil Courts 
Review recommended that the separate tests of title and interest to sue should be replaced 
with a single test (analogous to that applied in English law) of whether the petitioner had 
sufficient interest in the subject matter of the proceedings which would facilitate proceedings 
being brought in the public interest in appropriate cases.18 Before the Scottish Government 
could act on this recommendation by introducing a Bill, the Supreme Court changed the 
Scots law of standing to seek judicial review in AXA General Insurance v Lord Advocate.19 
In that case, a group of insurance companies sought judicial review to challenge the validity 
of the Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions) (Scotland) Act 2009, legislation which 
extended the liability of employers for conditions caused by exposure to asbestos. The 
respondents were individuals who had been diagnosed with pleural plaques caused by 
exposure to asbestos20, and who might have rights of action against their former employers 
under the legislation. The petitioners questioned the standing of some of the respondents. 
 
The Supreme Court confirmed that the respondents had standing, as had the courts below, but 
Lords Reed and Hope also seized the opportunity to rewrite the Scots law of standing to seek 
judicial review. Both said that whilst the requirement of showing title and interest to sue 
remained generally appropriate in private law cases it was not suitable for public law cases. 
Lord Hope declared: 
 
“As for the substantive law, I think that the time has come to recognise that the 
private law rule that title and interest has to be shown has no place in applications to 
the court's supervisory jurisdiction that lie in the field of public law. The word 
‘standing’ provides a more appropriate indication of the approach that should be 
adopted. I agree with Lord Reed (see para 170, below) that it cannot be based on the 
concept of rights, but must be based on the concept of interests.”21 
 
Lord Reed expressed the rationale of this more liberal approach to standing as being respect 
for the rule of law: 
 
“The essential function of the courts is however the preservation of the rule of law, 
which extends beyond the protection of individuals’ legal rights. … There is thus a 
public interest involved in judicial review proceedings, whether or not private rights 
may also be affected. A public authority can violate the rule of law without infringing 
the rights of any individual: … A rights-based approach to standing is therefore 
incompatible with the performance of the courts” function of preserving the rule of 
law, so far as that function requires the court to go beyond the protection of private 
rights: in particular, so far as it requires the courts to exercise a supervisory 
jurisdiction. The exercise of that jurisdiction necessarily requires a different approach 
to standing.”22 
 
                                                          
17 See, e.g. C. Munro, “Standing in judicial review” 1995 SLT (News) 30 and T. Mullen, “Standing to Seek 
Judicial Review”. 
18 See Report of the Scottish Civil Courts Review (2009), ch 12, paras 13-25, available at: 
http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/docs/aboutscs/vol1chap1_9.pdf?sfvrsn=10 
19 [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] SC (UKSC) 122. 
20 The legislation provided that the presence of such plaques could be considered a personal injury for purposes 
of the law of reparation. 
21 [2011] UKSC 46, para [62]. 
22 [2011] UKSC 46, para [169]. 
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That seemed a clear enough signal that the Court of Session should adopt a more liberal 
approach to public interest standing in future, but that court initially seemed reluctant to 
embrace the new approach. In Walton v Scottish Ministers,23 the court had to consider a 
challenge under the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984 to a proposal to build a new road near 
Aberdeen by a person who had long campaigned against the proposal. The court had to 
decide whether Mr Walton was “a person aggrieved” in terms of paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 to 
the 1984 Act and, therefore, entitled to challenge the road proposal. The Inner House24 
decided that Walton was not such a person aggrieved, commenting that a person cannot claim 
to be a person aggrieved under the 1984 Act simply because he was strongly opposed to the 
decision and had campaigned against it. He was no more than an opponent of the road 
scheme and in that respect was “no different from, say, someone who lives many hundreds of 
miles from the proposed route but has, on occasions, to travel to Aberdeen.”25 The court 
noted that the Supreme Court had recently broadened the law of standing in Axa but 
distinguished Axa on the basis that it concerned standing to invoke the supervisory 
jurisdiction whereas in Walton the court was not exercising its supervisory jurisdiction but 
considering an appeal under statute and so Axa did not assist in determining who was entitled 
to bring a case to court under the 1984 Act. 
 
This was a peculiarly narrow approach to adopt. In the first place, it was simply out of step 
with the wide interpretation that had been given to the term “person aggrieved” in statutory 
appeal provisions in a series of cases, particularly those under planning legislation. Persons 
who had made objections or representations as part of the procedure preceding the decisions 
challenged had generally been regarded as persons aggrieved.26 
 
Secondly, it was in effect a restatement of the private rights model of standing that had been 
rejected in Axa.  There are very close similarities between appeals to the court under the 1984 
Act, and under certain other statutes e.g. planning legislation which also use the term “person 
aggrieved” formula, and applications to the supervisory jurisdiction. The grounds of 
challenge to administrative decisions are essentially the same under these statutes as they are 
under the supervisory jurisdiction, as was explained in Wordie Property Co Ltd v Secretary of 
State for Scotland.27 Indeed, the Wordie case, which was a statutory appeal under the 
planning legislation, has been frequently cited as an authoritative statement of the grounds of 
judicial review in applications to the supervisory jurisdictions.28 Also, the considerations of 
legal policy favouring public interest standing apply just as much to these statutory schemes 
as they do to judicial review. Yet these legal policy considerations are not even mentioned in 
the court’s opinion. 
 
It is not, therefore, surprising that when Walton came to it on appeal the Supreme Court 
reiterated the need to take the new and broader approach to standing that it had stated in 
                                                          
23 Walton v Scottish Ministers [2012] UKSC 44; 2013 S.C. (UKSC) 67. 
24 [2012] CSIH 19. 
25 Ibid., para 37. 
26 See North East Fife District Council v Secretary of State for Scotland 1992 SLT 373; Cumming v Secretary of 
State for Scotland 1992 SC 463; Mackenzie’s Trustees v Highland Regional Council 1994 SC 693; Lardner v 
Renfrewshire District Council 1997 SC 104; Cook v Southend-on-Sea Borough Council [1990] 2 QB 1; Turner 
v Secretary of State for the Environment (1974) 28 P. & C.R. 123; Times Investment Ltd v Secretary of State for 
the Environment (1991) 61 P. & C.R. 98 (all cited by Lord Reed in the Supreme Court). 
27 1984 SLT 345. 
28 Lord Clyde and D. Edwards, Judicial Review (Edinburgh: W Green, 2000) 14.08, and  e.g., Strathclyde 
Passenger Executive v McGill Bus Service Ltd. 1984 SLT 377. 
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Axa.29 The Supreme Court rejected Walton’s challenge to the legality of the scheme, but 
confirmed that he was a “person aggrieved” for purposes of the Act. The factors which 
entitled him to bring the case were that Mr Walton made representations to the Scottish 
Ministers in accordance with the procedures laid down in the 1984 Act, and taken part in the 
local inquiry held under the Act. He was entitled as a participant in the procedure to be 
concerned about any unlawful failure to consult the public by Ministers or unfair procedure. 
He was not a mere busybody interfering in things which did not concern him. He resided in 
the vicinity of the new road. He was an active member of local environmental organisations 
and chairman of the local organisation formed specifically to oppose the scheme on 
environmental grounds. He was “indubitably a person aggrieved within the meaning of the 
legislation.”30 
 
Although strictly speaking, the case was concerned with the meaning of the statutory 
formula, “person aggrieved”, Lord Reed said that it might be helpful to discuss standing at 
common law “in view of the Extra Division’s observation that Mr Walton would lack 
standing, even if the test were the same as would apply to an application to the supervisory 
jurisdiction under the common law ...”.31 He said that in Axa the Supreme Court had: 
 
“… clarified the approach which should be adopted to the question of standing to 
bring an application to the supervisory jurisdiction. In doing so, it intended to put an 
end to an unduly restrictive approach which had too often obstructed the proper 
administration of justice: an approach which presupposed that the only function of the 
court’s supervisory jurisdiction was to redress individual grievances, and ignored its 
constitutional function of maintaining the rule of law.”32 
 
He went on to say that the factors which had supported Mr Walton’s entitlement to bring the 
present application as a “person aggrieved” would: “Mutatis mutandis, … also have given 
him standing to bring an application for judicial review ….” confirming that the broad 
approaches to common law standing applied equally to standing under this statutory formula. 
 
Lord Hope of Craighead also reiterated the reasons for taking a broad approach to standing 
that permitted public interest litigation and the comments of both were supported by the other 
judges. So, if the Supreme Courts’ message had not been understood the first time, there was 
now surely no doubt about the need to accept that the law of standing in judicial review had 
changed and was now far more receptive to public interest litigants. 
 
 
Developing the new approach to standing 
 
The test for standing for judicial review has now been put on a statutory footing; section 27B 
(2) of the Court of Session Act 1988; the court may not grant permission for judicial review 
unless the applicant can demonstrate “a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the 
application”. In effect this endorses the new approach to standing set out by the Supreme 
Court and, as the term “sufficient interest” is not defined, there is a need to elaborate the new 
approach which the Supreme Court and the legislation have introduced. Two uncertainties 
                                                          
29 [2012] UKSC 44; 2013 SC (UKSC) 67. 
30 Ibid., para 88. 
31 Ibid., para 89. Whilst this is a possible interpretation, it is not clear that the Extra Division intended to say that 
Mr Walton would have lacked standing to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction at common law. 
32 Ibid., para 90. 
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remain. One is whether the Court of Session will apply the new approach based on the rule of 
law rationale in the spirit which the Supreme Court intended. The other is what more detailed 
guidance the courts should create on the application of the sufficient interest test for standing. 
The judgments of Lords Reed and Hope in Axa and Walton provide only a general statement 
of the new approach to standing and the rationale for it. They do not resolve all of the issues 
that might arise when litigants assert that they have standing to sue in the public interest, in 
particular the factors which the court should take into account in deciding whether to 
recognise the standing of a public interest litigant. I will deal with the second issue first. 
 
Given that the new approach in Scots law was inspired by the approach taken in English law, 
it is worth looking at the factors which the English courts have referred to in recognising the 
standing of public interest litigants. The English cases suggest that where a person seeks to 
litigate to enforce the public interest rather than a personal interest, the court should take into 
account:33 
 
• the legislative framework within which the decision challenged was taken; 
• the strength and importance of the grounds of challenge; 
• whether any other person would be likely to raise the legal issues in question if 
standing were denied; 
• whether that person has relevant expertise either in the relevant law or in the subject 
matter that might assist the court; 
• the track record of the person in campaigning about or otherwise working on the 
issues raised by the case; 
• whether that person has participated in any consultation process that preceded the 
decision, and 
• the extent to which that person represents the interests of persons affected by the 
decision. 
Applying these factors, they have created a generous regime for public interest litigation. 
Interest groups and campaigning groups regularly appear in the courts to challenge pressure 
groups. Prominent examples include R. v Inspectorate of Pollution Ex parte Greenpeace Ltd 
(No.2),34 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ex parte Rees-
Mogg35 and R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ex parte World 
Development Movement Ltd.36 In Greenpeace Ltd (No 2), an environmental pressure group 
were recognised as having standing to seek judicial review of a decision to allow British 
Nuclear Fuels Plc to discharge radioactive waste from their plant at Sellafield, Cumbria in 
order to test their new thermal oxide reprocessing plant (THORP). In In Rees-Mogg, the 
claimant, who was described as a member of the House of Lords with an interest in 
constitutional issues, had standing to seek judicial review of the decision of the Foreign 
Secretary to ratify the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. In World Development 
Movement, a pressure group had standing to challenge the decision of the Foreign Secretary 
to approve financial assistance for construction of the Pergau River Dam in Malaysia under 
the ‘aid and trade’ provisions of the Overseas Development and Co-operation Act 1980. 
  
                                                          
33 See Lord Woolf, J Howell & A Le Sueur, De Smith’s Judicial Review, 6th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2007), 2-024-41. 
34 [1994] 4 All ER 329. 
35 [1994] QB 552. 
36 [1995] 1 W.L.R. 386. 
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Each of the factors listed above are appropriate if standing is considered in terms of the rule 
of law rationale for public interest litigation. Consideration of the legislative framework must 
always be appropriate in the light of the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament and broader 
democratic considerations. The strength and importance of the grounds of challenge is also in 
general an appropriate consideration as court time is a scarce resource which does require to 
be rationed. 
 
The likelihood that if the petitioner were denied standing, no-one else would make an 
equivalent challenge to the decision in question must be a powerful argument for recognising 
standing since this is exactly the problem with the private rights model that the rule of law 
rationale addresses. As Lord Reed said in Walton: 
 
… there may also be cases in which any individual, simply as a citizen, will have 
sufficient interest to bring a public authority's violation of the law to the attention of 
the court, without having to demonstrate any greater impact upon himself than upon 
other members of the public. The rule of law would not be maintained if, because 
everyone was equally affected by an unlawful act, no one was able to bring 
proceedings to challenge it.37 
 
The converse is not necessarily true. The fact that someone who has a personal interest is 
willing to bring the case should not automatically rule out recognition of the standing of any 
other public interest petitioner. Although the need to ensure that someone challenges an 
alleged illegality is the central aspect of the rule of law rationale, it does not exhaust it. It 
should be obvious that there may be more than two points of view as to how a disputed legal 
question should be resolved.  In some cases, if the argument is left entirely to petitioner and 
respondent, certain relevant points may not be raised. If there is/are also one or more public 
interest petitioners in the case, then that lessens the risk that relevant points will not be aired. 
This is essentially the rationale for public interest intervention which has been permitted in 
many cases and is discussed below. So, in appropriate cases, the rule of law rationale should 
be interpreted as allow public interest petitioners to bring proceedings alongside petitioners 
with a personal interest where they have something of value to add to the argument. 
 
The value of expertise hardly needs stating; the legal issues brought to court by public 
interest litigants often require consideration of complex factual questions for which the 
possession of specialised knowledge, for example, the environmental impact of development, 
(which the court does not possess) is valuable. However, as noted in Greenpeace (No. 2), the 
expertise that might be useful includes expertise in the law itself, as opposed to technical 
expertise in the relevant area of policy. Public bodies will usually already have, or can readily 
procure, reasonably expert advice on the relevant law. The same is not true of the average 
citizen or the average private sector lawyer. Pressure groups are more likely to have some 
expertise in the relevant law or to know which lawyers to go to in order to get it. 
 
However, the possession of expertise is not essential in all cases. There will always be cases 
which affect widely shared interests but which do not require technical expertise for their 
resolution. That is because social policy always depends ultimately upon values. So, whilst it 
is important to proceed on the basis of knowledge of the relevant facts, because all policy 
exists to advance certain values, the argument about what policy should be is always value 
laden. The contribution of interest groups lies in the analysis of the arguments for and against 
                                                          
37 Walton, para. 94. 
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policy proposals as well as the facts to which policy responds. Therefore, where what is 
disputed is, to a large extent, questions of value rather than technical matters, the court should 
not look too hard to find the petitioner’s expertise. 
 
Similarly, the fact that the litigant has a track record of campaigning about or otherwise 
working on the issues raised by the case should generally be treated as a factor in favour of 
granting standing, it too should not be treated as an absolute prerequisite, especially where it 
is unlikely that anyone else would be willing to bring the case. 
 
It also makes sense to consider whether the litigant has participated in any consultation 
process that preceded the decision; it is reasonable to expect those who are particularly 
concerned about draft legislation or any impending policy decision to make use of the 
opportunities given to take part in the political process. However, given that it is the public 
interest that is at stake, lack of participation should not automatically lead to rejection of a 
claim. Standing should only be refused on this basis if the rule of law will not be undermined 
e.g. someone else will raise the issue of legality, or if any damage to the rule of law is 
outweighed by other constitutional values. 
 
The ability of the claimant to represent persons affected by the decision has been treated as a 
significant factor weighing in favour of recognising standing, as in Greenpeace (No. 2). The 
extent to which this is relevant should vary according to the nature of the representative role. 
Cane has distinguished between three different types of representative standing: 
associational, public interest and surrogate standing.38 Space does not permit a full account 
but, briefly, by associational standing he means the situation where a group or organisation 
sues on behalf of its members, by surrogate standing he means the situation in which one 
person is the nominal pursuer/petitioner but represents the interests of another who may be 
regarded as the real applicant, and by public interest standing he means the situation in which 
an individual or group seeks to represent the interests of the whole public or a section of it 
rather than any identified or identifiable individuals. Whilst the actual capacity of a group or 
organisation to represent its members is relevant when the organisation sues on their behalf, it 
seems less so when the petitioner seeks to advance wider public interests rather than a group 
of people with a defined membership. 
 
Accordingly, I recommend that the Court of Session takes a similar approach to the English 
courts in developing law and practice on public interest standing and uses the same factors to 
decide when standing should be recognised. In this way, the court should be able to develop a 
coherent approach to public interest standing which flows from the rule of law rationale and 
is consistent with other constitutional values. 
 
 
Applying the new approach: standing after Walton 
 
As to the second area of uncertainty, it is not yet clear whether the Supreme Court’s approach 
as set out in Axa and Walton has been wholly accepted by the Court of Session. The most 
recent case on standing is Christian Institute v Lord Advocate,39 in which four charities and 
three individuals challenged the validity of Pt 4 of the Children and Young People (Scotland) 
Act 2014. The challenge related to the ‘named person’ scheme set up by the Act under which 
                                                          
38 P. Cane, “Standing up for the Public” [1995] Public Law 276. 
39 [2015] CSOH 7, 2015 SLT 72 
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there will be, when the legislation is fully operational, for every child or young person in 
Scotland an identified individual whose functions relate to promoting, supporting or 
safeguarding the wellbeing of that child or young person. The petitioners argued that that the 
provisions of Pt 4 were incompatible with (i) certain individual rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, in particular the right to family life (Article 8), freedom of 
religion (Article 9) and the right to education (Protocol 1, Article 2), (ii) the law of the 
European Union on data protection, and (iii) fundamental constitutional rights protected by 
the common law and authorised unjustifiable state interference with the rights of children and 
young persons and their parents. 
 
The arguments that the named person scheme was unlawful in these ways were weak and 
rightly rejected by the court. The court’s conclusions on standing were also correct in the 
circumstances of the case. However, some of the court’s comments on standing are more 
problematic.  Three of the seven petitioners were parents of school age children and the Lord 
Advocate conceded their standing. The other four petitioners were charities. Two were 
Christian charities (the Christian Institute) and the CARE (Christian Action Research and 
Education)).  The purposes of the Christian Institute included the furtherance and promotion 
of the Christian religion and the advancement of education. It was actively involved in legal 
work across the UK and claimed to defend cases of national importance for religious liberty. 
Care’s purposes included the provision of resources and help to provide Christian insight and 
experience in matters of law and public policy in the UK and in Scotland. The third, the 
Family Education Trust, was committed to researching the causes and consequences of 
family breakdown and promoting the welfare of children and young people. The fourth, the 
Young ME Sufferers (“Tymes”) Trust provided a service for children and young people 
suffering from ME and their families. It worked with and advised families, doctors, teachers, 
other specialists and the government. 
 
Lord Pentland acknowledged (referring to Walton v Scottish Ministers) that the court should 
not adopt an unduly restrictive approach to standing given that these were public law 
proceedings, but thought that the petitioners were ‘not in any realistic sense directly affected 
by Pt 4 of the Act.’ He thought that all four lacked sufficient interest entitling them to seek 
judicial review of Pt 4 of the Act. Fundamentally, none was entitled to challenge the vires of 
the Act on the ground that it contravened Convention rights as none was a “victim” of the 
violation for purposes of article 34 of the Convention.40 Insofar as the claims went beyond 
breach of Convention rights, there were further reasons for concluding that they did not have 
sufficient interest. Firstly, this was not a case in which their involvement was needed in order 
to ensure that the rule of law was upheld; that was catered for by the participation of the other 
three petitioners. Secondly, three of them had failed to participate in the consultation exercise 
that had preceded enactment. The fourth had participated in the consultation but the views 
expressed were too insubstantial to engender a sufficient interest. Thirdly, none of them had 
sufficient levels of expertise to support their claims to act in a representative capacity. 
 
The point concerning Convention rights is discussed below. The first and second of the 
further reasons appear reasonable in the circumstances It could not be said that the alleged 
illegality would go unchallenged if the standing of a public interest petitioner were not 
recognised, and there seemed to be no good reason why three of the four charities did not 
                                                          
40 Scotland Act 1998, s.100.  
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participate in either the consultation exercise which preceded the Act or the legislative 
scrutiny of the Act.41 
 
Lord Pentland’s approach to the issue of expertise is more questionable. He took a very 
demanding, arguably unduly demanding, approach. Whilst noting that two were Christian 
charities, he thought that the legislation did not affect questions of religion in any meaningful 
sense. Another was an educational charity but their activities were not focussed on systems 
and methods for providing public services relating to children. The Tymes Trust was a 
charity supporting children and young people with ME but the legislation was not concerned 
with that condition. Therefore, none of them was entitled to bring these proceedings on behalf 
of other persons who might potentially have had the requisite standing to challenge Pt 4 of 
the Act. 
 
Whilst these comments are all accurate, the effect of the Lord Ordinary’s approach was that 
four different charities which amongst them had interests in religion, education and children 
apparently could not amongst them muster the necessary expertise to be worth listening to. 
The obvious question is whether there actually exist charities or interest groups with interests 
and activities which are (a) more tightly focussed, and (b) more directly relevant to the 
legislation than the four petitioners in this case. There may well not be any. The fact is that 
interest groups typically define their aims and activities broadly and so they are unlikely to 
map neatly onto the concerns of any particular piece of legislation. Lord Pentland’s approach 
set an impossibly high standard for judging the relevance of expertise to litigation before the 
court; the assumption was made rather too readily that they had nothing to offer. If such a 
strict approach to expertise were to be repeated in future cases that would be a retrograde step 
that would stifle public interest litigation. 
 
Of course, Christian Institute is only one case and is an Outer House decision, but it seems 
not to be an isolated instance of an approach to standing which is continues to be more 
restrictive and more focussed on individual grievances than that required by AXA and Walton. 
Another such instance is the most recent Inner House decision on public interest intervention 
which is discussed in the next section. 
 
Lord Pentland’s summary rejection of the non-parent petitioners’ standing to challenge the 
legislation on the ground that it contravened convention rights was perhaps inevitable, but it 
points up a significant limitation of the new approach to standing. Under section 7(7) of the 
Human Rights Act and section 100(1) of the Scotland Act, standing is confined to those who 
are victims for the purposes of article 34 of the ECHR. Whilst in general it is appropriate to 
leave it to persons whose rights are infringed by specific acts and decisions, to challenge 
human rights violations, to leave that the only avenue for raising human rights claims will in 
practice mean that there will not be adequate supervision of the UK’s obligations under the 
ECHR and this does not satisfy the rule of law rationale.42 
 
It might be objected that the rule of law rationale does not apply because whenever a policy 
of a public body is  incompatible with convention rights there will in practice always be a 
‘victim’ who is willing to take a case to court. The objection would not be sound for two 
                                                          
41 The Education and Culture Committee of the Parliament had issued a general call for evidence at stage 1. 
42 Limitations of space preclude a full discussion of this topic. For more detailed analysis, see J Miles, 
“Standing under the Human Rights Act 1988: theories of rights enforcement and the nature of public law 
adjudication” 59(1) Cambridge Law Journal (2000) 133-167 and R. Clayton & H. Tomlinson, The Law of 
Human Rights (2nd edn) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)22.50-22.58. 
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reasons. First, as noted above, those who do have standing based on personal interests 
sometimes choose not to sue (or are unaware that they can sue). Second, particularly when 
dealing with policy decisions, whether expressed in legislation or otherwise, there will be 
situations in which it is preferable to have the compatibility of the policy with convention 
rights determined at an early stage rather than to wait for victims of specific decisions or 
actions to bring cases before the courts or tribunals.43 So, there is some need for public 
interest petitioners in human rights cases even if that need may arise less frequently than in, 
e.g. environmental law. To allow a public interest petitioner to raise an action in such 
situations would merely be an application of the general approach to standing mandated by 
Axa and Walton. 
 
There are two ways round the obstacle apparently presented by the victim test. One is to rely 
on common law fundamental rights rather than on convention rights and this basis for 
standing was accepted by Lord Pentland in the Christian Institute case. However, this is not 
wholly satisfactory; the common law on fundamental rights is relatively undeveloped 
compared to the law on convention rights and it cannot be said that for every convention right 
there is an equivalent common law right. It should, therefore, be possible to bypass the victim 
test in another way; it should be accepted that the failure of a public body to respect 
convention rights can provide a basis for standing independent of the Human Rights Act and 
the Scotland Act. 
 
One possible objection is that this would offend against the constitutional principle that an 
unincorporated treaty is not part of Scots law. That objection would not be sound because the 
decisions and actions challenged would be unlawful in terms of the Human Rights Act and 
the Scotland Act. A second possible objection is that it would be incompatible with 
Parliaments’ intention in enacting section 7(7) of the Human Rights Act and section 100(1) of 
the Scotland Act which was to limit challenges based on convention rights to victims as 
defined in article 34 of the ECHR. However, this is only one possible interpretation of those 
sections. A preferable reading is that the enactment of the victim test was not intended to cut 
across the expansion of public interest standing in administrative law in recent years, such a 
reading being more compatible with the rule of law than the restrictive reading. This reading 
does not render the statutory victim tests nugatory as it will only be rarely that the conditions 
that would justify allowing a non-victim to sue will be present. It does ensure that the 
requirements of the rule of law in this context are respected. 
 
 
Public interest intervention 
 
In Sustainable Shetland v Scottish Ministers,44 an environmental campaign group sought 
judicial review of a decision of the Scottish Ministers to grant consent for the construction of 
a substantial windfarm in Shetland under the Electricity Act 1989, on the basis, amongst 
other things, of the failure of Ministers to take proper account of the effect of the windfarm 
on a migratory bird, the Whimbrel. The Lord Ordinary’s decision that it was not competent 
for the Minister to give consent to a person who did not already have a licence to generate 
electricity (the applicant did not have such a licence) came as a surprise both to windfarm 
developers and to the Scottish Ministers. When her decision was reclaimed, applications to 
                                                          
43 Scottish Old People’s Welfare Council, Petitioners 1987 SLT 179 (discussed above) provides an excellent 
example in a non-human rights context. 
44 The case reached the Supreme Court on the substantive issue. See [2015] UKSC 4; 2015 S.L.T. 95. For the 
decision of the Inner House on the interventions, see [2013] CSIH 116; 2014 G.W.D. 2-38. 
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intervene in the proceedings were made: by the Trump Organisation which was opposing 
another wind farm development in Scotland and which sought to intervene both as a person 
directly affected and in the public interest; by AES K2 Ltd and others who were all 
developers of onshore and offshore windfarms who sought to intervene as persons directly 
affected; and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds which applied to intervene in the 
public interest.  
 
It is the treatment of the RSPB which is of most interest. The RSPB had been consulted when 
the application was made to the Scottish Ministers and had made representations. Their 
representations had been rejected and they had considered applying for judicial review but 
decided not to do so because of the potential expense. They had also decided not to enter the 
process when the case was in the Outer House. However, given that in the appeal, the Court 
would be considering the proper interpretation of the EU Birds Directive,45 they had decided 
to intervene at the appeal stage. They thought that there were wider considerations of which 
the RSPB had a unique understanding which meant that they could assist the court on the 
proper interpretation of the Directive. They argued that their intervention would not unduly 
delay the process, given that they would be content to submit a written submission, although 
they would prefer to have the ability to lodge a 10,000 word presentation. 
 
The Court noted that the approach to be taken to standing in judicial review petitions 
involving issues of public law was that set out in AXA and that this approach applied also to 
applications to intervene, but refused the motions to intervene from all parties. Lord 
Carloway, giving the Opinion of the Court, refused the RSPB’s application on the basis that, 
after their objections had been rejected by Ministers, they could have raised their own judicial 
review petition to challenge that decision or could have intervened in the Outer House. They 
had chosen not to do so and: 
 
“In these circumstances, the court does not consider it appropriate to allow them to 
enter the process at the appellate stage under the guise of a public interest 
intervention. Had they considered that their objections ought to have been sustained, 
or challenged any other aspect of the consent, they had the opportunity to do so at 
least in the Outer House proceedings. In any event, standing the positions of 
Sustainable Shetland and the Scottish Ministers, the court does not consider that any 
propositions advanced by the RSPB are likely to assist the court. The court will be 
hearing full argument upon the birds issue as focused in the grounds of appeal and the 
answers to them.” 
 
The first reason for refusing permission to intervene seems weak and once again is based on 
the assumptions of the private rights model of standing. Where a party is seeking to advance 
their personal interest, it would be legitimate to say, “you could have intervened at first 
instance, but you have now lost your chance.” This is less appropriate when the party 
represents the public interest because the refusal of permission may set back the public 
interest, including respect for the rule of law. Moreover, the typical public interest petitioner 
or intervener faces greater difficulties in funding litigation than do the public authorities and 
commercial organisations who are so frequently protagonists in environmental and planning 
litigation.  It is worth noting that in another Scottish case, Doogan v Greater Glasgow and 
Clyde Health Board,46 the Supreme Court saw no obstacle to permitting an intervention 
                                                          
45 Council Directive 2009/147/EC. 
46 [2014] UKSC 68, [2015] AC 640. The Royal College of Midwives and the British Pregnancy Advisory 
Service were each given permission by the Supreme Court to intervene in the appeal. 
15 
 
which was first sought only when the case reached that court. If we are serious about 
allowing public interest litigation we will not insist that public interest litigants must 
intervene at first instance or not at all. 
 
The second reason for refusing permission to intervene is not entirely convincing either. The 
court’s position seems to be that if a legal issue (in this case the requirements of the EU Birds 
Directive) is to be argued by one of the parties, there is no benefit to be derived from 
intervention. However, it should be obvious that there may be more than several points of 
view on how a disputed legal question should be resolved, and so if the argument is left to the 
petitioner and the respondent, certain relevant points may not be raised. That is one of the 
reasons why intervention is allowed. It may be that the Court was influenced by the fact the 
petitioner was a public interest litigant, so that to allow the RSPB to enter the process would 
be unnecessary and simply lead to duplication. Again, this is a dubious assumption. The 
RSPB clearly has great expertise in analysis of bird habitats, and it is not clear that 
Sustainable Shetland has equivalent expertise or that it would make the same points. The 
assumption that RSPB had nothing to add seems to have been made rather too briskly. 
 
It is also worth noting just how limited the burden imposed on other parties by public interest 
intervention under Scottish procedure is. Rule 58.20 envisages that an intervention will 
typically consist of a written submission which (excluding appendices) does not exceed 5,000 
words. Only in exceptional circumstances may the court allow a longer submission or an oral 
hearing. In the light of that, Sustainable Shetland appears to be a further example of 
unwillingness in the Court of Session to hear the message of AXA and Walton. Practice in the 
English courts appears to be more liberal; there have been many cases in which two or more 
public interest interveners and/or claimants have been permitted to appear. 
 
 
Protective expenses orders 
 
The third adjustment to the traditional approach which has been introduced to facilitate public 
interest litigation has been the protective expenses order. These are a relatively recent 
development in administrative law, having emerged in England and Wales from the late 
1990s and in Scotland, only since 2006. The normal rule in civil litigation is that expenses 
follow success; the party who loses has to pay the other party’s legal costs as well as his/her 
own. This is likely to act as strong disincentive to public interest litigation; an individual or 
organisation could face severe financial hardship as a result of losing a case, especially given 
that judicial review is available only in the Court of Session. The arguments for varying the 
normal expenses rule in cases brought in the public interest are essentially the same as those 
which supported a broadening of standing, i.e. the risk that the rule of law will be 
undermined. Broadening standing removed the most obvious barrier that prevented public 
interest litigants from bringing cases but left in place another barrier – that of cost – which 
can be extremely hard to surmount. The arguments for varying the normal rule have been 
accepted and such orders have become an established part of the system of public law 
remedies both in Scotland where they are known as protective expenses orders (PEOs) and in 
England and Wales where they are known as protective costs orders (PCOs). 
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I will not discuss PEOs in detail I have done this in a recent article,47 but they are worth 
considering precisely because they have been introduced to facilitate public interest litigation. 
Their development has been principally the work of the courts but to that has been added the 
statutory regime set out in Chapter 58A of the Rules of Court. This Rule of Court and the 
parallel rules for the other UK jurisdictions were made to implement the UK’s obligations 
under the Aarhus Convention and the EU Public Participation Directive (PPD) (Dir. 
2011/92/EU). There, are therefore, two distinct legal bases for making PEOs: the traditional 
discretion of the courts to regulate expenses (these are now referred to as PEOs) and the 
statutory regime. The former are potentially available in any area of public law; the latter 
only in environmental cases covered by the PPD. As a result there are significant differences 
of detail in the law applying to common law PEOs and that applying to environmental PEOs, 
the most striking of which is that the maximum liability of the applicant where the court 
makes an environmental PEO is £5000 and the court may reduce the liability to zero, whereas 
in common law cases there is no upper limit on the expenses cap. 
 
In principle, this seems to be an unsatisfactory situation as the justification for allowing the 
court to make PEOs in environmental cases is exactly the same as those for allowing the 
court to make PEOs in cases generally, i.e. upholding the rule of law by facilitating public 
interest litigation. That justification applies to all public interest litigation; environmental law 
cases are not uniquely important in this regard. It should not be significantly harder to obtain 
a PEO in one type of case than the other, nor should the nature of the orders made, e.g. the 
level of cost protection given two applicants be different in the two types of case. 
 
As yet, there is no clear evidence that it is more difficult to obtain a common law than an 
environmental law PEO,48 but the risk of a gap opening up in future remains and the 
development of such a gap would be inconsistent with the rule of law rationale and it will be 
important to monitor developments in this area. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Until recently, there was far less public interest litigation in the Scottish than the English 
courts. There was an obvious doctrinal reason for that; the private law model of standing that 
was applied in judicial review cases. That obstacle was apparently removed by the decisions 
of the Supreme Court in Axa and Walton and there has definitely been an increase in public 
interest litigation since those decisions as the cases cited in this article make clear. However, 
there is a variety of other reasons – space does not permit detailed analysis of them – why we 
would not expect there to be as many public interest cases per capita in the Scottish 
jurisdiction as there are in England and Wales. However, substantial further devolution of 
government functions, following the recommendations of the Smith Commission would 
increase the potential scope for public interest litigation in Scotland. 
 
                                                          
47 T. Mullen, “Protective expenses orders and public interest litigation”. See also K. Campbell, “Protective 
expenses orders: where have we got to?” 2014 SLT (News) 19. 
48 For cases in which environmental PEOS have been sought, see Carroll v Scottish Borders Council 2014 SLT 
659, Friends of Loch Etive (Petitioners) [2014] CSOH 116, John Muir Trust v Scottish Ministers [2014] CSOH; 
2015 G.W.D. 1-20 and  Gibson v Scottish Ministers [2015] CSOH 41; 2015 G.W.D. 13-224. For a common law 
application decided since the enactment of Rule 58A, see Hillhead Community Council v City of Glasgow 
Council 2015 SLT 239. 
17 
 
Having said that, it would be a mistake to conclude that all of the specifically legal barriers to 
public interest litigation have been lowered to an acceptable height. On the evidence of 
Sustainable Shetland, the Inner House does not yet appear to be as receptive to public interest 
litigants as the Supreme Court and specific decisions such as Sustainable Shetland, Christian 
Institute suggest that the implications of the rule of law rationale are not yet fully accepted. 
There has been substantial progress but more work remains to be done. 
 
